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3Abstract: In November 1941 the 
Canadian government, reacting to a 
British request, despatched “C” Force 
to reinforce the garrison at Hong 
Kong. Shortly after the Canadians 
arrived, the Japanese army attacked 
and captured the British colony.  
The entire Canadian contingent of 
almost 2,000 men was either killed or 
captured in the battle. Recriminations 
began immediately as Canadians 
tried to understand the reasons 
behind the despatch of the force. This 
argument was neatly summed up by 
Carl Vincent in his book titled, No 
Reason Why. Ignoring the simplicity 
of hindsight, this article re-examines 
the political and strategic situation 
of 1941 to better understand the 
decision-making process which led to 
the despatch of “C” Force. The article 
concludes that there were many 
reasons why the Canadians were sent 
to Hong Kong.
On 10 September 1941 the British chiefs of staff,  meeting in 
London, reversed their long standing 
opposition to sending additional 
troops to defend Hong Kong. They 
authorized the secretary of state 
for dominion affairs to invite the 
government of Canada to provide a 
“small force of one or two battalions” 
to reinforce the garrison at Hong 
Kong. To understand the British 
request and the Canadian reply we 
need to review developments in the 
Far East as they were understood in 
1941.
 T h e  d y n a m i c  f a c t o r  w a s 
unquestionably the expansionist 
program of the dominant groups in 
Japanese society. Since we are not 
asking a question about Japanese 
imperialism we do not need to examine 
its origins or debate its legitimacy. By 
1937 the Japanese Empire included 
Formosa (1898), Korea (1910) and 
Manchuria (1931). After Japan’s 
withdrawal from the League of 
Nations the military, particularly 
the army, “came to dominate 
government to the point where it 
could effectively veto individual 
ministerial appointments.”1 In 1936 
Japan joined the Anti-Commintern 
Pact aligning itself with Hitler and 
Mussolini against the Soviet Union. 
The next year, after what is known as 
the Marco Polo bridge incident, Japan 
began a “special undeclared war” to 
gain effective control of China.
 Despite long standing American 
and European involvement in 
China the western powers were 
quite unwilling to intervene and, 
by the outbreak of war in Europe, 
Japan had conquered northeastern 
China and a number of coastal 
areas including Canton and the 
territory adjacent to Hong Kong. 
Neither successful military action nor 
systematic terrorism such as the Rape 
of Nanking persuaded the president 
of China, Chiang Kai-Shek or the 
communist leader Mao Tse Tung to 
agree to surrender so the undeclared 
war against China continued.
 From the summer of 1939 to 
mid-1941 the Japanese navy pressed 
its case for expansion to secure 
the resources of southeast Asia, 
especially the oil fields of the Dutch 
East Indies. After June 1940, Japan 
forced the Vichy government in 
France to hand over bases in northern 
Indo-China and persuaded the British 
to temporarily close the Burma Road, 
the Chinese nationalist army’s supply 
route. When the Japanese signed the 
Tripartite Pact linking their future 
with Germany and Italy and a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet 
Union, the decks were cleared for the 
navy’s program of expansion. This at 
least was the popular theory in Japan.
 The major, perhaps the only, 
obstacle was the United States 
which had finally begun to react to 
Japanese aggression. The occupation 
of northern Indo-China was met by a 
series of American trade embargoes 
including a ban on the export of scrap 
iron and aviation fuel to Japan. These 
measures had the opposite effect to 
the one intended; the decision makers 
in Japan were increasingly persuaded 
that only war would provide access 
to the resources Japan required.
 War seemed to be a viable option 
because of the military weakness of 
Britain and the United States. Japan 
could easily win a series of campaigns 
in the first months of the war, go 
over to the defensive and negotiate a 
satisfactory peace, or so the Japanese 
military argued.
 The apparent success of the 
German invasion of Russia prompted 
the Japanese Navy to press for 
immediate action and in July 1941, 
Japan announced a “protectorate” 
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4over all of Indo-China. The United 
States, followed by Britain, the 
Dominions and the Netherlands 
froze Japanese assets and imposed a 
total trade embargo including oil.
 The British government sought to 
link these initiatives with a warning 
to Japan about the consequences of 
future expansion. When Churchill 
met Roosevelt in August 1941, in the 
waters off Newfoundland, he asked 
FDR to agree to a joint declaration 
warning the  Japanese  of  the 
consequences of further expansion, 
but strong isolationist sentiment in 
the US Congress persuaded Roosevelt 
to deal bilaterally with the Japanese.2
 American policy in the Pacific 
had long  been  based on  the 
assumption that war with Japan 
could be avoided or postponed by 
diplomatic and economic pressure. 
This view was underwritten by 
the United States Navy which had 
continuously reviewed and war-
gamed conflict with Japan. These 
studies demonstrated that, however 
successful Japan might be in the early 
stages of a war, it could not win a 
prolonged conflict with America. 
An economy less than one tenth 
the size of the United States, Japan 
was already fully committed to 
war production, could not possibly 
compete with the industrial potential 
of the US and American planners 
believed the Japanese knew this. As 
indeed they did.
 The US Navy had also concluded 
that in the event of war the Philippines 
would be lost so there was no point 
in sending reinforcements, but in 
July 1941 the US Chiefs of Staff 
changed their minds. If Japan was 
to be deterred instead of defeated 
it was necessary to strengthen 
American defences and signal the US 
commitment to the Philippines. The 
recall of General Douglas MacArthur 
to active service and his appointment 
as commander of US (and Philippine) 
forces in the Far East was announced 
with great fanfare.3 Reinforcements, 
and the ultimate deterrent of the era, 
B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers, were 
to be sent to the islands as quickly as 
possible.
 In Ottawa and other Canadian 
cities these events were reported in 
front-page stories and debated in 
editorials.4 More detailed information 
reached External Affairs and National 
Defence headquarters through 
diplomatic channels.5 Everything 
pointed to a renewed US commitment 
to leadership in the Pacific.
 The British government was 
placed in a very difficult position 
by the American refusal to agree to 
a clearly phrased warning to Japan. 
From the British perspective the US 
was forcing Japan to choose between 
war and peace while avoiding 
responsibility for defending the 
most likely victims of war: Thailand, 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. 
But in the summer of 1941 US foreign 
policy appeared to be working. The 
Japanese prime minister, Prince 
Konoye, reorganized his cabinet on 
16 July removing the leading pro-
German member and replacing him 
with a moderate. Prince Konoye 
also proposed a direct meeting with 
Roosevelt. No such meeting took 
place but discussions over a general 
settlement began in September when 
a new Japanese emissary arrived in 
Washington and continued until the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Churchill and Roosevelt met at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 1941 to 
discuss the war. One the topics discussed was how to dissuade the Japanese 
from further aggression. Ironically, Churchill was transported to the meeting 
aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales (below left) which was sunk by the 
Japanese along with HMS Repulse only four months later.
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/2
5 We must now look more closely 
at the British decisions about the 
Far East. First, let us remember that 
Winston Churchill and his chiefs of 
staff were somewhat preoccupied 
with other matters in mid-1941. The 
German invasion of the Soviet Union 
which began on 21 June threatened 
the very survival of the Soviet state. 
Britain could do little except expedite 
the shipment of supplies to Russia, 
but this meant aircraft and tanks 
needed in other theatres must be 
diverted. The Battle of the Atlantic, 
and the air offensive over Germany 
also required close attention but 
above all other issues the War 
Cabinet focused on preparations 
for Operation “Crusader,” General 
Claude Auchinleck’s desert offensive 
scheduled for early November 1941.6
 The situation in the Far East could 
not be entirely ignored especially 
because the Australian government 
was pressing for action. On 31 August 
1941 Churchill sent a “Secret and 
Personal” message to the Australian 
prime minister noting that “events 
about Japan seem to have taken a 
more favourable turn in the last 
month…I cannot believe that the 
Japanese will face the encounter 
now developing around them. We 
may therefore regard the situation 
not only as more favourable but 
less tense. Nevertheless,” Churchill 
continued,
the growth of our battleship strength, 
ravages made upon the German 
Navy, which is now reduced apart 
from Tirpitz and U-Boats, to very 
modest proportions and the measure 
we now have taken of the Italian 
Navy make it possible in the near 
future for us to place heavy ships in 
the Indian Ocean…before the end of 
the year.7
The Australians, who were pressing 
Churchill to withdraw their troops 
from Tobruk and concentrate their 
Middle Eastern divisions under 
Australian command, were very 
unhappy with this statement and 
replied, “The strategy of the war 
insofar as it affected Australian co-
operation depended on the presence 
of capital ships in Singapore.”8 
Unspecified ships in the Indian Ocean 
were of little value to Australia.
 With this background we are 
able to reconstruct the process of 
decision making in September 1941. 
Churchill has just returned from 
his meeting with Roosevelt which 
produced the Atlantic Charter and, 
he believed, an agreement to issue 
a general warning to Japan against 
further expansion. He continued to 
stall on the Australian request for a 
fleet based in Singapore and rejected 
proposals for further reinforcement 
of Malaya although he and his 
colleagues were well aware that the 
Royal Air Force, which was supposed 
to be the key to defence of the colony, 
was under-strength and employed 
obsolete aircraft. Churchill did not 
believe any priority could be given 
to what he called “a hypothetical 
problem when so many immediate 
issues threatened Britain’s survival.”9 
The Australians, concerned with their 
own survival, did not agree.
 It is therefore clear that the 
question of sending additional 
reinforcements to Hong Kong 
would never have been considered 
if Major-General A.E. Grasett had 
not suggested that the Canadian 
government could be persuaded 
to supply the troops. Grasett, as 
general officer commanding British 
Troops in China, had long argued in 
favour of strengthening the garrison 
of Hong Kong. Upon his retirement 
in August 1941 he had returned to 
England via Canada where he had 
“long discussions” with his Royal 
Military College of Canada classmate 
Major-General Harry Crerar, chief of 
the general staff (CGS).
 The two men had studied the 
problems of defending Hong Kong 
at the Imperial Defence College in 
1934 so there was a wide ranging 
and informal discussion of the issues. 
The minister of national defence, J.L. 
Ralston, joined the conversations 
and heard Grasett argue that “two 
additional battalions” would render 
the garrison strong enough to 
withstand, for an extensive period 
of siege, an attack by such forces 
as the Japanese could bring to bear 
against it.10 Grasett also learned much 
about the state of the Canadian army 
and the concern that recruiting was 
suffering because there were no signs 
that the Canadians were likely to 
become involved in action overseas. 
According to Crerar, Grasett did 
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Major-General Arthur Grasett, the 
previous commander of British Troops 
in Hong Kong and former classmate of 
Major-General Harry Crerar, played a 
major role in facilitating the despatch 
of Canadian troops to Hong Kong.
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6not raise the question of Canadian 
participation in the defence of Hong 
Kong but it is not difficult to see how 
he developed the idea.
 In London, Grasett presented his 
views on the defence of Hong Kong 
to the chiefs of staff and suggested 
that the needed reinforcements might 
come from Canada.11 This idea put 
the question in an entirely different 
light. Up until then any addition to 
the defences of Hong Kong would 
have had to come from Malaya and 
this was clearly impossible. Canadian 
troops, drawn from those based in 
Canada not England, would bring 
a net addition to Allied strength 
in the area. The Americans and 
the Chinese would welcome such 
concrete evidence of commitment to 
the defence of the Far East which the 
British themselves were unwilling 
to provide.
 The chiefs of staff quickly agreed 
and sent a memorandum to Churchill 
recommending that Canada be asked 
to provide a “small reinforcement.” 
Churchill still held the view that in 
the event of war with Japan, Hong 
Kong could not be held or relieved, 
but this proposal added credibility to 
both deterrence and the prospect of a 
prolonged resistance. He accepted the 
recommendation with the provision 
that “a further decision should be 
taken before the battalions actually 
sail.”12
 A cypher telegram was quickly 
dispatched to Ottawa. It read, in part:
Position in the Far East now, 
however, changed. Our defences 
in Malaya have been improved and 
there have been signs of a certain 
weakening in Japanese attitudes 
towards us and the United States. 
In these circumstances it is thought 
that a small reinforcement of 
garrison at Hong Kong e.g. by 
one or two more battalions, would 
be very fully justified. It would 
increase strength of garrison out 
of all proportion to actual numbers 
involved, and it would provide a 
strong stimulus to garrison and 
Colony; it would further have 
a very great moral effect in the 
whole of the Far East and would 
reassure Chiang Kai-Shek as to 
reality of our intention to hold 
the island.
 His Majesty’s Government 
in Canada will be well aware 
of difficulties we are at present 
experiencing in providing forces 
which situation in various parts of 
the world demands, despite very 
great assistance which is being 
furnished by the Dominions. We 
should therefore be most grateful 
if the Canadian Government 
would consider whether one or 
two Canadian battalions could 
be provided from Canada for 
this purpose. It is thought that 
in view of their special position 
in the north Pacific, Canadian 
Government would in any case 
have wish to be informed of need 
as we see it for reinforcement of 
Hong Kong and special value of 
such measure, even though on a 
very limited scale at the present 
time. It may also be mentioned that 
the United States have recently 
despatched a small reinforcement 
to the Philippines. It would be of 
the greatest help if the Canadian 
Government could co-operate 
with us in the manner suggested, 
and we much hope they will feel 
free to do so.
 If the Canadian Government 
agree in principle to send one or 
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Two of the principal actors in the 
decision to send Canadian troops to 
Hong Kong were the minister of national 
defence, J.L. Ralston (left) and Major-
General H.D.G. Crerar, chief of the 
general staff (right). This photograph 
was taken on the occasion of the sailing 
of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
to England on 2 August 1941. Major-
General C.B. Price (shaking Ralston’s 
hand) is the commander of the division 
and to the right is Ernest Lapointe, 
minister of justice and attorney general.
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/2
7two battalions, we should propose 
to communicate with you again 
as to best time for their despatch, 
having regard to general political 
situation in the Far East.
Signed,
The Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs
The wording of this telegram has been 
criticized by C.P. Stacey, the official 
historian, as wrongly implying 
“that the outpost policy had been 
abandoned.”13 Brereton Greenhous 
is much harsher implying that 
“perfidious Albion” was deliberately 
deceiving the Canadians.14 There 
is no evidence to support such 
an interpretation but the wording 
is certainly ambiguous. The key 
question is how did the responsible 
Canadian decision makers interpret 
the request and why did they accept 
it?
 The minister of national defence 
was absent on 19 September and the 
telegram was first read by the acting 
minister, C.G. “Chubby” Power. 
According to Power his immediate 
response was positive. “It struck 
me as being the only thing to do.” 
He contacted the CGS who agreed 
that Canada had a “political and 
moral obligation” to assist Britain 
in the these circumstances. Major-
General Crerar then discussed the 
proposal with his vice chief, Major-
General Ken Stuart and deputy chief, 
Major-General Maurice Pope, who 
supported Crerar’s assessment.15
 The War Cabinet which met on 
23 September was also in favour 
but Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
insisted that the final decision be 
deferred until the defence minister 
had given his approval. Colonel J.L. 
Ralston was a man of extraordinary 
ability, widely recognized as the 
most powerful figure in the cabinet. 
Ralston had commanded a battalion 
on the Western Front in the Great 
War and was acutely aware of both 
the sacrifices the army had made 
and the reputation it had won in 
that conflict. He had overcome the 
hesitations of the prime minister 
and the opposition of some of his 
colleagues to create a large army 
and was determined to see that army 
play a major role in the Allied war 
effort.16 Ralston could scarcely refuse 
an opportunity to employ Canadian 
forces in any theatre.
 The pol i t ica l  case  for  the 
expeditionary force was summed 
up by Mr. Justice Duff who formed 
Canadian ambassador to China, Major-General Victor Odlum, with Chiang Kai-Shek 
and other Chinese officials and dignitaries, 15 March 1944.
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investigate the Hong Kong affair.
The evidence discloses various 
reasons which appear to have 
actuated the War Committee [of 
Cabinet]. In view of what the other 
Dominions had done in Abyssinia 
and Libya it was Canada’s turn to 
help; Canada ought to share in the 
responsibility for garrisoning the 
Pacific area, just as Australia was 
assisting Malaya, the military value of 
the reinforcement would be out of all 
proportion to the numbers involved; 
the arrival of the contingent in Hong 
Kong would have a great moral effect 
in the whole of the Far East and 
would reassure the Chinese as to the 
British intention to hold Hong Kong, 
the moral effect of the expedition 
might operate as a sensible influence 
for the preservation of peace there; 
at that juncture, in September, to 
gain time was beyond measure 
important; such an appeal from the 
predominant partner in the common 
cause could not be rejected.17
The political case was clear enough 
but what of the responsibility of the 
CGS to offer advice about the military 
soundness of the decision. Crerar, 
as we have seen, knew a good deal 
about the problems of defending 
Hong Kong from his days at the 
Imperial Defence College.18 If he was 
persuaded that the addition of two 
battalions to the garrison of Hong 
Kong would by itself allow the colony 
to be defended for a prolonged 
period then his military judgment 
was certainly wrong. The problem is 
that no one could predict what would 
happen in the event of war. Would 
the Japanese attack Russia? Would 
they move south avoiding British 
territory? If they attacked in South 
East Asia would Hong Kong be an 
immediate target? If Hong Kong was 
attacked what role would the British 
and American fleets play? If Japan 
lost the initial battles would Hong 
Kong be rapidly reinforced? Who 
knew what might happen. In Manila 
General Douglas MacArthur was 
convinced there would be “no attack 
before spring” and was confident 
that any Japanese invasion would be 
easily repulsed.19 Crerar could not in 
fact offer advice about the military 
soundness of a proposal, which was 
in essence political and strategic.
 With the decision made the CGS 
turned to the question of which units 
should be selected. Crerar’s choice 
of the Royal Rifles of Canada and 
the Winnipeg Grenadiers has been 
subject of much controversy. After the 
surrender of Hong Kong questions 
about the training and equipment of 
Force “C” led to a Royal Commission 
which examined the question in 
detail. The procedure followed 
was that the director of military 
training was asked to categorize all 
of the infantry battalions in Canada 
in terms of their state of training. 
The ten most advanced battalions 
included the nine allocated to the 
4th Canadian Infantry Division (it 
had not yet been converted to an 
armoured division) and another in 
Newfoundland. A second group 
were somewhat less advanced and 
nine more were in a third category 
“due either to recent employment 
requiring a period of refresher 
training” or insufficient training, 
these Category C battalions were 
“not recommended for operational 
employment at present.”20
 Crerar was unwilling to take 
battalions from 4th Division and 
quickly decided that two of the 
Category C battalions which had 
recently returned from garrison 
duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica 
were the best choice. Ralston’s only 
complaint was that other battalions 
which had not yet been out of Canada 
might see this second assignment 
overseas as “discrimination against 
them.”21
 The debate before the Royal 
Commission revolved around 
charges that battalions were not 
fully trained. The Royal Rifles of 
Canada were mobilized in 1940 after 
amalgamation with the 7/1 Hussars of 
the Eastern Townships. A Permanent 
Force officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
William James Home, MC, was 
selected to command the regiment 
which included a large number 
of field officers with First World 
War experience. Most prominent 
was Lieutenant-Colonel John H. 
Price, MC, who reverted to the rank 
of major and became second-in-
command of the battalion. Recruiting 
was done selectively throughout 
eastern Quebec and New Brunswick 
and despite an agreement that only 
English speaking volunteers would 
be enlisted nearly 40 percent were 
bi-lingual Francophones.22
 It was not easy to train for 
modern war in Canada during 1940-
41. The limited modern equipment 
available had been used to outfit the 
1st and 2nd Divisions. The Royal 
Rifles
had at all times their full share of 
rifles and bayonets, an adequate 
supply of light machine guns and 
pistols and their full scale of transport 
vehicles. They had one 2” mortar for 
instructional purposes; but with this 
exception they had no mortars or 
anti-tank rifles.23
Two-inch mortars were made 
available, two per company, before 
the battalion left for Hong Kong and 
two 3-inch inch mortars, the standard 
1941 allotment, were issued to the 
mortar platoon. Mortar bombs were 
unavailable and were to be supplied 
from British resources in Hong 
Kong.24 The fact that the Canadian 
government had not created the 
domestic capacity to manufacture 
Opposite: A Japanese propaganda leaflet 
dropped on British (and Canadian) 
troops in Hong Kong.
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something as simple as mortar bombs 
was not commented upon by the 
Royal Commission.
 The Royals had been trained by 
their own officers and NCOs with 
little reference to the Directorate of 
Military Training. Garrison duty 
in Newfoundland interfered with 
advanced training but the battalion 
worked at company level exercises 
whenever it could. After the battalion 
was concentrated at St. John’s in 
the spring of 1941 both military 
training25 and sports programs were 
intensified. The hockey rink, boxing 
ring and football field were a crucial 
testing ground for soldiers and the 
junior NCOs and the vital combat 
leaders were usually selected from 
the playing field.
 The  Winnipeg Grenadiers 
mobilized as a machine gun battalion 
at the outbreak of the war but were 
sent to the West Indies in June 1940 
as an infantry battalion. For a year 
the Grenadiers garrisoned Jamaica 
and carried out section and platoon 
training. Practice ammunition was 
not available so the men learned the 
drills but most did not actually fire 
their weapons until October 1941 
after the battalion had returned to 
Winnipeg.26 Neither the Royals nor 
the Grenadiers could remotely be 
considered “an efficient and well 
trained battalion” except by the 
standards prevailing in Canada 
in 1941 and this was precisely the 
argument put forward by the military 
before the Royal Commission which 
concluded:
Top left: Soldiers of the Royal Rifles 
of Canada wait at the Valcartier train 
station to begin their journey to Hong 
Kong, 23 October 1941.
Middle left: Soldiers of the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers mingle with their families 
before entraining for the west coast and 
ultimately Hong Kong, 25 October 1941.
Bottom left: Civilian stevedores load 
military equipment aboard HMT Awatea 
prior to its departure from Vancouver for 
Hong Kong, 27 October 1941.
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Another Chief of the General Staff 
in the same circumstances might 
perhaps not unreasonably have 
taken another view. But I think the 
balance of practical considerations 
favoured the course actually taken. 
There is therefore no good ground 
for imputing to General Crerar, in 
the matter of selecting battalions to 
compose the expeditionary force, any 
error in judgement, much less any 
dereliction of duty.27
One other matter must be investigated. 
When Churchill gave his approval he 
had insisted that “a further decision 
should be taken before the battalions 
actually sail.” According to the 
official history, Churchill was asked 
for his approval on 2 October and 
gave it. Six days later “the Chiefs of 
Staff authorized the reinforcement 
operation to proceed”28 and shortly 
thereafter requested Ottawa to 
provide a Brigade Headquarters and 
specialist detachments before what 
was officially designated as “C” Force 
sailed on 22 October.
 Neither the British chiefs of staff 
nor Churchill reconsidered their 
authorization in the light of the 
very dramatic changes occurring in 
Japan. On 16 October Prince Konoye 
resigned as premier and two days 
later the army minister General Tojo 
formed a new Japanese government. 
We now know that the Tojo Cabinet 
agreed on a decision to go to war 
before the end of 1941 unless the 
United States accepted Japanese 
terms for peace, but this was not 
understood in London or Ottawa.
 Churchill ’s  reaction to the 
changed situation was summed up 
in a “Most Secret” message to John 
Curtin, pPrime minister of Australia, 
on 26 October:
I am still inclined to think that 
Japan will not run into war…
unless or until Russia is decisively 
broken. Perhaps even then they 
will wait for the promised invasion 
of the British Isles in the spring. 
Russian resistance is still strong 
especially in front of Moscow and 
winter is now near.
... in order to further deter Japan, 
we are sending forthwith our 
newest battleship Prince of Wales 
to join HMS Repulse in the Indian 
Ocean. This is done in spite of 
protests of the C in C Home Fleet 
and is a serious risk to run. The 
Prince of Wales will be noticed at 
Cape Town quite soon...29
With Churchill now pursuing a policy 
of deterrence through symbolic 
acts there could be no question of 
changing the decision to send Force 
“C” to Hong Kong. Indeed, Churchill 
had informed the Australians of 
the Canadian commitment and 
this had greatly encouraged the 
government in Canberra. There was 
even a suggestion that Canada be 
invited to send a brigade to Malaya30 
but fortunately there was no time to 
act upon it.
 The mood in Washington was 
somewhat different. On 24 October 
the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox 
told reporters, “the Japanese have no 
intention of giving up their plans for 
expansion. If they pursue that course 
a collision there is inevitable.”31 The 
State Department was unhappy 
with Knox’s statement, which was 
headline news in Ottawa as well as 
New York and Washington. Evidence 
from decrypts of Japanese diplomatic 
cables now indicated that Japan’s 
negotiator in Washington had been 
told that he had until 25 November 
to obtain an agreement and efforts 
to produce a temporary agreement 
were underway.32 This was the 
situation when Force “C” arrived 
in Honolulu on 2 November. There 
is no indication that the Americans 
considered intervening to warn the 
Canadians of the increased likelihood 
of war. Marine detachments from 
China were enroute to Manila and 
other reinforcements in transit to the 
Phillipines from the United States.33 
On 14 November the “C” Force convoy 
anchored in Manila Bay to rendevous 
with HMS Danae, a cruiser which 
was to escort “C” Force on the final 
leg to Hong Kong. At that moment 
Washington was preoccupied with 
preparations to meet a new Japanese 
envoy, London was absorbed by 
Operation “Crusader” which began 
on 18 November and Ottawa was out 
of the loop.
 It is nevertheless evident that if 
a re-examination of the decision to 
send “C” Force to Hong Kong had 
occurred no responsible Canadian 
official would have argued for its 
cancellation. Great publicity had 
been given to the decision to send a 
fleet to Singapore34 and preparations 
were underway to publicize the 
reinforcement of Hong Kong. On 
Sunday 16 November, Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King announced the 
arrival of a Canadian force at Hong 
Kong. The text of his statement read:
Defence against aggression actual or 
threatened, in any part of the world 
is today a part of the defence of every 
country which still enjoys freedom. 
It is in accordance with this view 
that the Government has deemed 
it advisable to associate Canadian 
troops with those of forces from other 
parts of the British Commonwealth 
now stationed in the Orient.35
The statement was well received 
throughout Canada. The Ottawa 
Journal, no friend of the government, 
was enthusiastic, informing its readers 
“that in the defence of freedom there 
can be no such thing as regional 
responsibility.”36 The Toronto Star, 
which had carried detailed reports 
of the deteriorating situation in the 
Pacific, suggested Hong Kong “may 
prove an island Tobruk. And the 
Canadians are proud to be there to 
defend it.”37 The Winnipeg Free Press, 
with full knowledge that one of the 
city’s regiments was there, reported 
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that the Canadian expeditionary 
force was regarded as a “diplomatic 
master stroke.” The editor noted 
with approval that “more Canadian 
troops might be sent to Hong Kong 
or other bases in the Pacific.”38 On 
25 November the Free Press carried 
an op-ed piece on the Canadians 
in Hong Kong which was highly 
critical of the government for failing 
to publicize the arrival of the troops 
“as a declaration before the world of 
where we stand if it comes to war in 
the Pacific.” The Free Press believed 
Canadians were starved for news 
of their national war effort and the 
arrival of “C” Force was a perfect 
opportunity to “mobilize all out 
support for the war.”39 The second 
guessing would not begin until the 
announcement of the surrender.
 The public now shared the 
knowledge that Canadians could 
be involved in a war in the Far 
East. They were there to deter war 
if possible and fight if war came. 
When Carl Vincent wrote his oft-
quoted study of the Canadian role at 
Hong Kong he chose to title his book 
No Reason Why.40 In fact there were 
many reasons why the Canadians 
were in Hong Kong. This is clear 
when the actions of the Canadian 
government and its military advisors 
are examined in the context of 1941 
without the benefit of hindsight.
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